SECTION HEAD (m/f)

The “International programmes” section coordinates the exchanges with international regulatory bodies in the nuclear field and acts as counterpart for programmes of international organisations like the IAEA and OECD/NEA. In the area of regulatory research the section is responsible for following up on the national and international research programmes and for the overarching coordination of projects with direct ENSI participation.

Your tasks

• Lead the section in administrative matters
• Contribute to the further strategic development of ENSI international programmes
• Coordinate projects in connection with ENSI international obligations
• Represent the inspectorate in international meetings and working groups
• Write reports on topics related to the section activities (in German and English)

Your qualifications

You need to have a M.S. in a technical discipline with a strong background in the field of nuclear energy. You are acquainted with energy policy issues at the Swiss and international level. Your experience in the nuclear energy field has been acquired working for a regulatory body or an international organisation, which allows you to have an established contact network with the relevant partners. You show initiative and a positive attitude for teamwork. Excellent oral and written communication skills are im-portant for the discussions and negotiations with the different national and international stakeholders. You are fluent in English and German. Knowledge of French is an asset.

We offer a very challenging and multifaceted job with various opportunities for further education and development.
The location is Brugg AG (Switzerland).

Full job description as PDF (1 MB)

Please send your complete application in German and English to the following address:

Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat ENSI
Verena von Atzigen
Human Resources
Industriestrasse 19
5200 Brugg
Tel. 056 460 85 53
verena.vonatzigen@ensi.ch

Learn more about the results of the Swiss National Report in our german article.

You can also download the whole report as PDF here.

The IRRS Mission to Switzerland includes the 10 core modules based on the IAEA’s document “Integrated Regulatory Review Service – Guidelines for the Preparation and the Conduct of IRRS Missions” (Edition 2010).

Core Modules:
• Module 1 Responsibilities and Functions of the Government
• Module 2 Global Nuclear Safety Regime
• Module 3 Responsibilities and Functions of the Regulatory Body
• Module 4 Management System of the Regulatory Body
• Module 5 Authorization
• Module 6 Review and Assessment
• Module 7 Inspection
• Module 8 Enforcement
• Module 9 Regulations and Guides
• Module 10 Emergency Preparedness and Response

1. Assessment of overall plant safety
2. Assessment of the balance of the risk contributions
3. Assessment of the safety impact of plant modifications
4. Evaluation and rating of reportable events
5. Assessment of the safety importance of components
6. Probabilistic evaluation of operational experience

In accordance with international PSA practice, no requirements regarding the consideration
of risks due to war, terror and sabotage are provided in this guideline.

Guideline ENSI-A05 English

The Surveillance Report pertains to the way ENSI perceived its responsibilities in 2010 and how it assessed nuclear safety in that year. ENSI monitors the entire life cycle of a nuclear facility, from initial planning, construction, commissioning and operation through to the post-operative phase, dismantling and the disposal of radioactive waste.

In order to provide an overview of the safety of Swiss nuclear power plants that is as comprehensive and realistic as possible, ENSI incorporates the individual aspects of preventive safety into an overall assessment. The methodology used is described in the Appendix of the Surveillance Report under the heading “Sicherheitsbewertung” [Safety Evaluation). The results for individual nuclear power plants are included in the plant-specific section of the report. For each plant/unit, the safety evaluation is represented in tabular form using a mosaic of different colours to display clearly the strengths and weaknesses of each plant. ENSI can thereby identify where improvements in preventive safety are required and operators must then submit their proposals for improvements. In recent years, ENSI has also given each nuclear power plant an overall qualitative assessment and for 2010, it has gone one stage further and introduced an element of differentiation in the overall assessment.

In accordance with the logic applied to safety evaluations, ENSI now assesses separately the safety impact of individual criteria, i.e. it has assessed the safety of design parameters, operating parameters, state and behaviour of the plant and the state and behaviour of human and organisational factors. This means that for the first time, plant design is the subject of a dedicated assessment and thus the overall evaluation shows clear differences between older and new facilities. As a result of extensive retrofitting over and above the international norm, ENSI rates the design safety of the older plants at Beznau and Mühleberg as “good”. Thanks to technical progress achieved in the 1970s, the design of the newer plants at Gösgen and Leibstadt is of an even higher safety standard and hence ENSI rates their safety as “high”.

Since the catastrophic events at the Fukushima plant in Japan on 11 March 2011, there has been a fundamental shift in the way the public regards nuclear facilities in Switzerland. Three days after Fukushima, the Swiss Federal Council suspended all applications for general licenses for the construction of new nuclear power plants. Two months later, Switzerland embarked on a political process that will see the phasing out of nuclear power for the purpose of electricity generation. This means a change to some of ENSI’s responsibilities as its previous assessment of new build projects is no longer relevant.

However, surveillance of the nuclear power plants currently in operation remains a key task. Monitoring existing nuclear power plants in Switzerland to ensure that they meet required safety levels is as important as it was before Fukushima. In addition, it is essential that we learn the lessons from events in Japan.

Paris – At a Panel Discussion on Tuesday at the “OECD Forum on the Fukushima Accident: Insights and Approaches,” Hans Wanner, the ENSI Director commented on the lessons that could be learned from the accident in Japan.

For example, location-specific risk assumptions for nuclear power plants must be updated regularly to reflect the latest findings. Nuclear power plants should be designed so that they can manage such risks, said Wanner. There needs to be a critical review of crisis management following nuclear accidents and serious, concurrent damage to a country’s infrastructure. In addition, crisis management must be practised regularly. Further improvements are required in the international exchange of information following a nuclear accident. The IAEA has a crucial role to play in this respect.

On the subject of statutory general licenses, Wanner emphasised that effective nuclear surveillance requires an independent authority – this is also an IAEA demand. In addition, the operators of nuclear power plants must have a statutory obligation to upgrade their facility to reflect the latest developments in science and technology.

Wanner went on to say that Switzerland had already introduced several measures to improve nuclear safety following Fukushima. All countries with nuclear power plants have a vested interest in ensuring that domestic safety standards comply with international standards. Although the full details of the Fukushima accident are not yet available, now is the right time to strengthen international surveillance by introducing binding requirements.

Brugg - Following the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the European Council decided on 25 March to review the safety of all 143 nuclear power plants in the EU in the light of what had happened in Japan. The review will take the form of a new and transparent safety evaluation - a Stress Test. The scope of the Stress Test, including its methodology was drawn up by the nuclear regulators in EU member states. It was approved by the European Commission on 25 May 2011. The specification for the Stress Test requires operators of nuclear power plants to submit specific analyses and evaluations. Following a review, they will be incorporated into a report for each country.

Focus on three scenarios

The EU Stress Test must be completed for each location with a nuclear power plant. It will focus on the following three scenarios:

• the extreme natural events that played a role at Fukushima, i.e. earthquakes and flooding of any type,
• effect of loss of power and cooling water supply: irrespective of the trigger, the test will investigate scenarios such as the sustained loss of power for considerable periods and examine the resultant effects,
• effectiveness of emergency safety measures: The tests will consider a range of serious accidents and assume that several safety systems and barriers have also failed. It will then look at what countermeasures exist.

For each of the three scenarios, operators are required to relate their comments to the current design. In addition, they must comment explicitly on safety margins (i.e. margins in excess of design). The reference date for the evaluation is 30 June 2011 (design and operation of plant on that date).

For security reasons, accident scenarios following a terrorist attack cannot be handled in the same transparent way. They will be reviewed in Phase 2, which will be conducted by a special working group consisting of representatives from relevant bodies in the individual country. The European Council will specify the mandate and methodology to be used by this group.

Timetable for EU Stress Test

The timetable for the EU Stress Tests is identical for each country and runs from 1 June 2011. The timetable in Switzerland is as follows: each operator must submit its analysis of the three scenarios to ENSI by 31 October 2011. ENSI will evaluate the analyses and compile a national report for Switzerland by the end of 2011. This is followed by the EU Peer Review and the final results should be ready for the June 2012 meeting of the EU Council. The peer review process is currently the subject of international negotiation.

Swiss and EU Tests are complementary

The reviews required under the EU Stress Tests will run in tandem with the review already started in Switzerland.

Unlike most other countries in Europe, Switzerland has already re-evaluated earthquake and flood risks on the basis of recent scientific findings. On 18 March 2011, ENSI ordered a review using current data of the following three scenarios: earthquake, floods and a combination of earthquake and earthquake-induced flooding. This data will go beyond the scope of the EU Stress Tests.

For other scenarios, e.g. the sustained loss of power supply and a detailed assessment of emergency measures if external conditions are extremely difficult – such as after a severe earthquake – the current EU Stress Test will supplement the current investigations by ENSI.

On 1 June 2011, the operators of Swiss nuclear power plants established a common external store for emergency equipment at a former munitions depot of the Swiss Army at Reitnau in Aargau. ENSI had ordered operators to set up the store following the Fukushima accident (see media release of 18 March 2011). This accident has shown that nuclear power plants need speedy access to additional pumps, emergency generators, tubing, fuel and other equipment following a serious external event.

As a result, ENSI also insisted that the emergency equipment should be transportable by helicopter. The equipment at Reitnau is, therefore transportable by air and could be flown quickly to any required location in a Swiss Army Super Puma. The equipment would be used if the emergency diesel supply at a nuclear power plant failed or if water from rivers could not be used for emergency cooling.

The store is situated at an altitude that is secure from flooding and is located in bunkered buildings. The operators of all nuclear power plants in Switzerland have access to the store.