SECTION HEAD (m/f)

The “International programmes” section coordinates the exchanges with international regulatory bodies in the nuclear field and acts as counterpart for programmes of international organisations like the IAEA and OECD/NEA. In the area of regulatory research the section is responsible for following up on the national and international research programmes and for the overarching coordination of projects with direct ENSI participation.

Your tasks

• Lead the section in administrative matters
• Contribute to the further strategic development of ENSI international programmes
• Coordinate projects in connection with ENSI international obligations
• Represent the inspectorate in international meetings and working groups
• Write reports on topics related to the section activities (in German and English)

Your qualifications

You need to have a M.S. in a technical discipline with a strong background in the field of nuclear energy. You are acquainted with energy policy issues at the Swiss and international level. Your experience in the nuclear energy field has been acquired working for a regulatory body or an international organisation, which allows you to have an established contact network with the relevant partners. You show initiative and a positive attitude for teamwork. Excellent oral and written communication skills are im-portant for the discussions and negotiations with the different national and international stakeholders. You are fluent in English and German. Knowledge of French is an asset.

We offer a very challenging and multifaceted job with various opportunities for further education and development.
The location is Brugg AG (Switzerland).

Full job description as PDF (1 MB)

Please send your complete application in German and English to the following address:

Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat ENSI
Verena von Atzigen
Human Resources
Industriestrasse 19
5200 Brugg
Tel. 056 460 85 53
verena.vonatzigen@ensi.ch

When a release occurs, moreover, the calculation should make it possible to identify the areas that the radioactive cloud will reach, and when this will happen. This enables targeted deployment of the measuring instrumentation and the intervention forces; the population can then be alerted promptly by means of alarms so that they can take precautions to protect themselves.

In the preliminary phase, i.e. prior to the start of a release of radioactivity, there is no possibility of referring to measurements of radioactivity in the surrounding area. Instead, the hazard must be estimated with the help of model calculations based on the current situation in the plant as well as the weather conditions.

Dispersion calculations adapted to Swiss conditions

In case of an accident entailing a risk that radioactivity may be released into the surrounding area, ENSI uses the complex model for atmospheric dispersion calculations known as ADPIC (Atmospheric Diffusion Particle-In-Cell Model). ADPIC takes account of the topography and the local wind conditions.

ADPIC allows the direct use of 3-D wind fields from the COSMO2 model which, for its part, supplies forecasts with relatively high spatial resolution up to 24 hours in advance. When COSMO2 is used, the 3-D wind data are scaled down to the resolutions required by the dispersion model with the help of a standard wind field model.

The ADPIC dispersion model was developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and was selected on the basis of a model evaluation carried out between 1990 and 1995. This evaluation was based on tracer experiments in the Gösgen area involving enrichment of the air with a substance so that the transported volumes could be measured. Extensive adaptations were required to enable operational deployment of this model in Switzerland, particularly in respect of the online acquisition of meteorological data, three-dimensional wind fields and the visualisation of the results.

Diagnosis and prognosis

In case of an incident, the ADPIC dispersion model permits a realistic assessment of the radiological hazard to the population on the basis of up-to-date meteorological data. For diagnostic calculations – i.e. the determination of dispersion that has already occurred – the data measured by the operational stations of MeteoSwiss (the Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology) are used as input.

For prognostic calculations, i.e. forecasting, the COSMO2 forecasting model of MeteoSwiss is used. ADPIC is operational for diagnostic and prognostic calculations relating to all nuclear plants:

• Routine calculations with a single standard source (1 Bq/s Cs-137) are carried out automatically at hourly intervals round the clock, for three different release levels.
• In case of events and emergency exercises, incident-specific calculations can be expected no later than within the first hour of operational readiness of the ENSI emergency response organisation.

The main purposes of the routine calculations are to ensure that the system is continuously available, and to monitor the current dispersion situation (with forecasts for the next six hours). Moreover, routine calculations can be used for an initial assessment in case of an event.

The main purpose of incident-specific calculations in the preliminary and cloud phases is to assess the hazard to the population in the area surrounding the nuclear power plant in case of a previous or subsequent release of radioactive substances. These calculations serve as the basis for demarcating the area that may be at risk, and for decisions on any additional measurements and actions that may be necessary in order to protect the population.

Ongoing development of the models

The ADPIC programme that ENSI currently uses for dispersion calculations attained the last stage of its development in 2011. ADPIC corresponds to the latest state of the art and is internationally recognised. Ongoing development of the dispersion calculation system is essential so that demanding requirements for quality can continue to be met in the future.

For this reason, ENSI launched the RADUK project (Radiological Dispersion Calculations in the Areas Surrounding Nuclear Plants) in January 2011, so that ADPIC can be taken out of service and replaced by a modern system. With support from partner organisations − MeteoSwiss, the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) and other foreign institutions − the European JRODOS platform (Java-based Real-time On-line Decision Support System) is due to be introduced at ENSI by the start of 2015 in combination with the LASAT (Lagrangian Simulation of Aerosol Transport) dispersion calculation programme. These steps will pave the way for the long-term continuation of a key emergency instrument.

Most important of all, the new system offers a wide range for simulations and synergies with the NEOC, MeteoSwiss and the EU. Other advantages include an improved cost-to-benefit ratio and a modern operating and visualisation interface.

Example of a dispersion calculation

Learn more about the results of the Swiss National Report in our german article.

You can also download the whole report as PDF here.

The IRRS Mission to Switzerland includes the 10 core modules based on the IAEA’s document “Integrated Regulatory Review Service – Guidelines for the Preparation and the Conduct of IRRS Missions” (Edition 2010).

Core Modules:
• Module 1 Responsibilities and Functions of the Government
• Module 2 Global Nuclear Safety Regime
• Module 3 Responsibilities and Functions of the Regulatory Body
• Module 4 Management System of the Regulatory Body
• Module 5 Authorization
• Module 6 Review and Assessment
• Module 7 Inspection
• Module 8 Enforcement
• Module 9 Regulations and Guides
• Module 10 Emergency Preparedness and Response

See more on the IRRS mission in the dossiers section.

The description of the event is only available in German.

1. Assessment of overall plant safety
2. Assessment of the balance of the risk contributions
3. Assessment of the safety impact of plant modifications
4. Evaluation and rating of reportable events
5. Assessment of the safety importance of components
6. Probabilistic evaluation of operational experience

In accordance with international PSA practice, no requirements regarding the consideration
of risks due to war, terror and sabotage are provided in this guideline.

Guideline ENSI-A05 English

All of us are on hand to witness every event live, round the clock – no matter where it might happen. Because we are kept up to speed in this way, we are expected to form opinions about anything and everything. Immediately. And that makes us part of the herd.

This is exactly what happened in connection with the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant on 11 March: we saw the earth move, we saw people seeking refuge underneath their desks, we watched as the flood wave swept over the land, we witnessed the explosions and we saw the smoke rising up. Live.

We were stunned and shocked. And we felt deep sympathy with the people who were affected.

This terrible earthquake and the catastrophic tsunami had a profound impact on all of us, especially in terms of the nature of our future relationship with nuclear power after the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

With such an emotionally charged mood prevailing, the employees of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) have a particular responsibility to shoulder. However, our mission is not to sway public opinion in any specific direction.

On the contrary, our remit is to make the basic facts, the data and the knowledge available to interested members of the public, so that each individual can comprehend the complex circumstances and is able to form his or her own opinion. We carry out this mission on the basis of complete openness and transparency.

We made a start on evaluating the information as soon as we received the first news reports from Japan. We garnered this information from every conceivable source, and checked its plausibility. But ENSI is also part of the international network, so Switzerland, like every other country, has access to important information in order to assess the situation.

Three days after the earthquake in Japan, the Federal Council halted the licensing process for new nuclear power plants, and the responsible working group was now assigned a new task: to process the events at Fukushima.

Safety is not a static condition – it is a process.

Based on early findings about the progression of the accident, ENSI ordered its first specific measure on 18 March: power plant operators were obliged to set up a central storage facility containing diesel generators, pumps and other emergency resources so that they would be able to procure sufficient equipment and materials from a safe location in case of severe accidents.

As the second measure, we asked the Swiss nuclear power plant operators to submit three sets of documentary proof on a staggered basis: proof of their ability to bring the 10,000-year flood under control, proof of ability to control the 10,000-year earthquake, and proof of ability to control a combination of earthquake and earthquake-induced failure of dam installations whose areas of influence include nuclear power plants.

These exercises are not being carried out as alibis to appease public opinion. If, within the stipulated periods, operators are unable to prove that a damaging incident involving radiation exposure above the limits can be be excluded in case of these natural disasters, they must withdraw their plants from the grid. Any applicable back-fitting measures would have to be implemented while the nuclear power plant is shut down.

To make the point crystal clear: there is no leeway for discretion, and no compromises will be accepted. Neither political circles nor any lobbying groups can influence ENSI’s decisions. It is impossible to place sufficient emphasis on the fact that we are an independent supervisory authority.
As such, we are also aware that the safety of nuclear plants is not merely a national matter. The safety of nuclear facilities is an international issue, and this is why we participate in the relevant international bodies. We are merely at the start of a lengthy and complex process of analysis.

It has to be a vital concern for every country that the IAEA Safety Standards should follow the rules of best practice and the latest developments in science and technology, and also that they should be valid throughout the world and should be implemented by the national supervisory authorities.

It was for these reasons that I proposed a strengthening of the global nuclear safety system at an OECD conference in Paris early in June. One measure in this regard would be to monitor the activities of national supervisory authorities by means of a peer review process.
Starting today, another meeting of ministers is taking place at the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, and Switzerland is also taking part in this event. We shall be putting our viewpoint forward with absolute clarity.

Hans Wanner, Director of ENSI

The Surveillance Report pertains to the way ENSI perceived its responsibilities in 2010 and how it assessed nuclear safety in that year. ENSI monitors the entire life cycle of a nuclear facility, from initial planning, construction, commissioning and operation through to the post-operative phase, dismantling and the disposal of radioactive waste.

In order to provide an overview of the safety of Swiss nuclear power plants that is as comprehensive and realistic as possible, ENSI incorporates the individual aspects of preventive safety into an overall assessment. The methodology used is described in the Appendix of the Surveillance Report under the heading “Sicherheitsbewertung” [Safety Evaluation). The results for individual nuclear power plants are included in the plant-specific section of the report. For each plant/unit, the safety evaluation is represented in tabular form using a mosaic of different colours to display clearly the strengths and weaknesses of each plant. ENSI can thereby identify where improvements in preventive safety are required and operators must then submit their proposals for improvements. In recent years, ENSI has also given each nuclear power plant an overall qualitative assessment and for 2010, it has gone one stage further and introduced an element of differentiation in the overall assessment.

In accordance with the logic applied to safety evaluations, ENSI now assesses separately the safety impact of individual criteria, i.e. it has assessed the safety of design parameters, operating parameters, state and behaviour of the plant and the state and behaviour of human and organisational factors. This means that for the first time, plant design is the subject of a dedicated assessment and thus the overall evaluation shows clear differences between older and new facilities. As a result of extensive retrofitting over and above the international norm, ENSI rates the design safety of the older plants at Beznau and Mühleberg as “good”. Thanks to technical progress achieved in the 1970s, the design of the newer plants at Gösgen and Leibstadt is of an even higher safety standard and hence ENSI rates their safety as “high”.

Since the catastrophic events at the Fukushima plant in Japan on 11 March 2011, there has been a fundamental shift in the way the public regards nuclear facilities in Switzerland. Three days after Fukushima, the Swiss Federal Council suspended all applications for general licenses for the construction of new nuclear power plants. Two months later, Switzerland embarked on a political process that will see the phasing out of nuclear power for the purpose of electricity generation. This means a change to some of ENSI’s responsibilities as its previous assessment of new build projects is no longer relevant.

However, surveillance of the nuclear power plants currently in operation remains a key task. Monitoring existing nuclear power plants in Switzerland to ensure that they meet required safety levels is as important as it was before Fukushima. In addition, it is essential that we learn the lessons from events in Japan.

In this guideline, applicants for the construction and operation of nuclear plants, as well as parties obliged to carry out decommissioning, are given equal status to licensees as far as the requirements are concerned. For ease of reading, the term “licensee” is used below to denote all of these categories.

There are references to other ENSI guidelines as follows: the requirements for documentation are specified in guideline ENSI-G09. The requirements for training and qualification of the staff of nuclear plants are stipulated in guidelines ENSI-B10 and ENSI-B13. Emergency planning and emergency preparedness are covered by guideline ENSI-B12. The requirements for periodic reporting and the duty to notify organisational changes are specified in guidelines ENSI-B02 and ENSI-B03, respectively. The requirements for handling decommissioning projects are stipulated in guideline ENSI-G17.

ENSI-G07 External Hearing, Explanatory Report (in german)